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INFORMED SPECULATION: SMALL MARKETS AGAINST LARGE MARKETS
by
Frederic PALOMINO 
European University Institute 
Florence (Italy)
Abstract
Informed speculation has become a popular area of research in Economics. 
However, the main part of the existing literature focuses on the amount of 
information revealed by price. In this paper, we will try to derive some properties 
of informed traders' welfare in imperfectly competitive markets. Two cases will be 
studied: a market with both heterogeneously informed speculators and noise traders 
and a purely speculative market. A discussion on the possible existence of several 
informationally isolated small markets will follow.
I would like to thank Alan Kirman and Robert Waldmann for helpful comments, 
























































































































































































In 50 BC, all of Gaul is occupied by Romans... All? No! A village populated by 
unshakeable Gauls still offers resistance to the invader.
Among the residents of this village is Obelix, chairman and unique employee of 
Obelix and Co., a firm specialized in menhir production. It is rumoured that he has 
discovered a revolutionnary production process for menhirs. However, if some of the 
inhabitants of the village believe it, there are others who are rather skeptical.
As Obelix does not want to answer any of the insistent questions from the board of 
administration of Obelix and Co., the shareholders decide, individually, that during 
their daily boar hunt, they will spy on him in his quarry. However, as all of them did 
so at different hours of the day, they all gathered different pieces of information 
about the new production process.
While a spontaneous meeting of Obelix and Co. shareholders was taking place in the 
market place, Getafix, the druid, was conceiving one of his great plans. Getafix, 
whose fame was built upon his discovery of the famous magic potion, used to defeat 
the Romans, and his precious gift of tea to the Britons’, happened to be a pacifist, 
and thus, in order to avoid the general brawl of the last annual general meeting, he 
decided to organize a unique large stock market. He observed that not only risk- 
averse heterogeneously informed shareholders trying to maximize their utility were 
trading but also a group of people buying a totally random amount of stock just for 
fun. Getafix wondered if he had chosen the best market structure and whether he 
would have increased the welfare of the shareholders by organizing several small 
markets.
More than two thousand years later, informed speculation has become a popular area 
of research in Economics. However, the main part of the existing literature focuses 
on the amount of information revealed by prices. Grossman (1976, 1978) established 
that, under specific assumptions about the distribution of the private information and 
traders' utility, competitive markets with heterogeneously informed traders are 
informationnally efficient. It follows that if the acquisition of information is 
endogenous and costly, then an equilibrium does not exist1 2.
Tirole (1982, proposition 1) explained this result by stating that in a Rational 
Expectation Equilibrium of a purely speculative market with traders of homogeneous 
prior beliefs, risk-averse traders will not trade, risk neutral traders may trade but they 
will not expect any gain from trade. If any of these assumptions is dropped then 
static speculation occurs. In most of the models, this has led to adding some irrational 
demand or supply. A reason for introducing irrational traders is given by Shleiffer 
and Summers (1990):
"Some investors are not fully rational and their demand for risky asset is affected by
1 See Goscinny and Uderzo: "Astérix chez les bretons"




























































































For example, in France, we can observe that the results of the national football team 
affect the behaviour of some traders the day after a game.
Irrational demand is most of the time described as noise trading. In the literature two 
definitions are usually found. Kyle (1984, 1985, 1989) defines noise trading as a 
random, exogenous, inelastic demand of assets. De Long, Shleiffer, Summers, 
Waldmann (1989,1990a) assume that noise traders are "the ones who falsely believe 
that they have special information about the future price of risky assets". The main 
difference between the two definitions is that in the latter, noise trading is also the 
result of a maximizing behaviour and thus is not infinitely inelastic with respect to 
prices. As Shleiffer and Summers explain, there is an implicit assumption behind 
these two definitions:
"These demand shifts will only matter if they are correlated accross noise traders. 
If all investors trade randomly, their trades cancel out and there are no aggregate 
shifts in demand. Undoubtedly, some trading in the market brings together noise 
traders with different models who cancel each other out. However, many trading 
strategies based on pseudo-signals, noise, and popular models are correlated, leading 
to aggregate demand shifts. The reason for this is that judgement biases afflicting 
investors in processing information tends to be the same. Subjects in psychological 
experiments tend to make the same mistake; they do not make random mistakes."
In dynamic models, irrational demand may also be modeled as feedback trading: 
traders' demand at time t is a function of the price variation between t-2 and t-13.
As Grossman and Tirole's results led to fully revealing equilibria, several papers 
focused on the aggregation of information in noisy rational expectation economies. 
Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verecchia (1981) concluded that as long as the number 
of informed traders is finite, private information has an impact on equilibrium prices. 
Therefore rational traders should take this effect into account when computing their 
asset demands and then act as imperfect competitors. The only situation where 
competitive behaviour is rational is where it is assumed that there is a continuum of 
informed speculators. The main contribution under the alternative assumption of 
imperfect competition is due to Kyle (1989) but once more it is mainly informational 
properties that are highlighted.
As far as we know, only few papers have focused on traders' welfare. Under perfect 
competition assumptions , Laffont (1985) has demonstrated that partially revealing 
rational expectation equilibria are not Pareto optimal but that fully revealing REE are. 
Under the assumption that traders act strategically, Stein (1987) wondered if "more 
informed speculation was better than less". In other words, we would like to know 
if informed speculators prefer to trade in large markets rather than in small ones, 
given that they do not have perfect information, and so they would learn more
their beliefs or sentiments that are not fully justified by fundamental news."





























































































information from prices in a large market.
The goal of this paper is to try to answer partially this question, when considering 
a market with heterogeneously informed speculators. We will proceed as follows. In 
section 2, Kyle's model and main properties will be presented. Within this 
framework, in section 3 some welfare results in a market with both noise traders and 
heterogeneously informed traders will be given. In section 4, speculators' welfare will 
be analyzed when they trade in a purely speculative market and are endowed with 
both private information and a random amount of the risky asset traded.
II KYLE'S MODEL
a) Presentation of the model:
One risky asset is traded at a clearing price p. After trade occurs the liquidation value 
v is realized, v is normally distributed with mean zero and variance X.j’.
Three kinds of traders participate in the market: noise traders, informed speculators 
and uninformed speculators.
Noise traders trade in aggregate an exo^eneous random quantity z, normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance cr,.
There are N informed speculators, indexed n=l,...,N. Each trader is endowed with a 
signal y„=v+e,„ where ev ...,eN are normally and independently distributed with mean 
zero and variance x/1 and are independent of v and z. Each trader has an exponential 
utility function and choose a demand schedule K, G i v e n  p, the quantity traded 
is k„=Kn(p,y„).
Then the utility can be written U„=-exp(-b,I"IJ where b, is the constant absolute 
aversion and n ,„=(v-p)k„.
There are M uninformed speculators, indexed m=l,...,M. They have an exponential 
utility function and choose a demand schedule XJ.). Given p, the quantity traded is 
xm=XJp).
Then the utility can be written V„,=-exp(-buV\uJ  where bu is the constant absolute risk 
aversion and t lUm=(v-p)x„,.
All speculators have non stochastic initial endowment which are normalized to zero.
We define a Rational Expectation Equilibrium of Imperfect Competition as vectors of 
strategies K=(K,,...,KN>, X=(X1,...,XM) and a random variable p such that the following 
three conditions hold:
1: For all n=2,...,N, and for any alternative vector of strategies X' differing from X 





























































































2: For all and for any alternative vector of strategies K' differing from X
only in the mth component K„„ the strategy K yields no less utility than K':
ElUJ(v-p(X,K))kJX,K)I > EIUJ(v-p(XX))kJX,K')l
3: Markets clear with probability one
XX „ +LXm = z
However, we will consider a particular category of equilibria.
Definition: A symmetric linear equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the strategies K„ 
(n=l,...,N) are identical linear functions and strategies X„, (m=l,...,M) are identical linear 
functions. Thus, there exist constants P, y„ yu, 0„ 9U such that (for all n=l,...,N and 
m=l,...,M) the strategies Kn and X,„ can be -written:
(!) KSP 'V„)^rf,y..-y,p x „(p)=0u-v
b) Existence and Uniqueness of a symmetric linear REE:
Given the market equilibrium condition:
(2) E  j f i x » +2=°
we can compute Var(v\ p) and Var(vI p,y„).
(3) xu=Var~'(v | p) x=var-\v \ p,yJ
then








proof: See Kyle (1989), appendix A.
tpu and cp, are parameters of measuring the informational efficiency. Prices become 
fully revealing when the paramaters are equal to one.
From these results, we can compute E(vI p) and E(ul p,y„):





























































































(7) E(v | M J = ------ — y„+-fi-rl(NY,+Myu)p-N6l-M 6uj
xi Px/
Proof: see Kyle (1989), appendix A.
We now compute the asset demand of the trader. From equations (1) and (2), we can 
write:
(g) p=p,„+¥'„
Then Kyle demonstrates the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Assume phl, v and yn are jointly normally distributed. Let a,, a2, av and t’ be 
constant such that:
(10> E(5 I <9)' Var~'(v \ p,„,y„)= t*
Let k„ denote the maximizing quantity and p' be the maximizing price and assume that the 
second order condition 2Xi+biVar(v\ pb„y„)>0 holds:
- If Xi(l+a;)+b/x'*0, then phl can be expressed as a function of y„ and p, and k,,' as a 
function of y„ and p‘ as follows:
. .  E(f> | p ‘,y ) - p '
(ID ----- ’ ,
- If Xfl+af+b/x'^O, then pln cannot be expressed as a function of y„.The demand schedule 
gives p' as a function of y„ but not pbl:
2Xt+bfx'
( 1 2 )
Proof: see Kyle (1989), pp 326-327.
Theorem: Assume a/>0 and ie>0. If N>2 and M>I, or if N>3 and M=0, or if M>3 and 
N=0, then there exists a unique symmetric linear equilibrium. //N =l and M>2, a symmetric 
linear equilibrium exists if M is sufficiently large (holding other parameters constant) and 
does not exist if p,j is sufficiently large (holding other parameters constant). If N+M<2, a 
symmetric linear equilibrium does not exist.
Proof: See Kyle (1989), pp 329-330.
Kyle discussed extensively the properties of the equilibrium in the case N>2 and M>1. 
An interesting result is that strictly less than a half of the private information is 




























































































equilibrium price never becomes fully revealing. This means that the equilibrium 
does not converge to the equilibrium of perfect competition when the number of 
insiders become large.
However, Kyle did not focus on the welfare aspect of his results.
Ill SOME WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
In this section, using Kyle's results, we will try to find out if traders are better off 
when the number of informed traders increases. This point is of importance since the 
case where only one trader has some private information is quite unrealistic. As 
already explained in the introduction, the problem is to know if traders with private 
information will trade on markets where many other traders also have private 
information or rather trade on markets where the number of informed traders is 
small. To answer this question, we compute the expected utility of a trader just after 
the observation of his private signal as a function of the number of traders in the 
market. Two cases will be studied. In the first one, the size of noise trading measured 
by its variance is fixed. In the second case, the size of the noise trading is 
proportionnai to the number of informed traders.
For simplicity, we will consider the case where all traders have some private 
information (M=0), so we will drop the index I.
a) Characterization of the Equilibrium:
(p, x are still given by equations (5) and (4) and E(v I p,y„) is simplified:
, , , ,  . (l-<P)x« Mpyxe Mpex,




N9(px (l-(p)x Pt -N-ytpx 





From the definition of a symmetric linear equilibrium, we have to solve the following 
system of equations:
(15) P--







[1+ ‘]+b/ t‘*0 and
(IV-1) y Px-






































































































and P is the unique positive solution of the third equation above.
Proof: Rearranging (15.c) yields (16.b). From (16.b), y is positive, then the only solution 
for (14.b) is 6=0. Substituing (16.b) in (15.a) and rearranging yields (16.c).
We know from the previous theorem that the equilibrium is unique. (16.c) admits 3 
solutions and one of them (P>0) satisfies the two inequalities. QED
Proposition 1: There exists N° such that for all N>N° P(N) is decreasing. Furthermore, 
LimN̂ _ P(N)=0.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
Before interpreting the proposition, it is useful to compute the equilibrium price.
Let n ^ n  then E „ = i ^ +z'=0 imPlies
(17) p = lÿ +_L f
V Ny
From (5) and (16), x=xv+[Nzr-(N- 3 )p/>]/2. Then,
p[2x +Afx -(Af-l)Pé]
(18) y=-î-L- ------— -----—
Nxr (N-l)Pb
So, p can be rewritten as follows: 
Nxt -(N -l)Pb
(19) pH ](y+— z) P[2xv+NT'-(N-l)fib] N p
Looking at the expressions of p and cp, we can find a possible explanation for 
proposition 1. When N is small, the price reveals few information but the amount of 
information conveyed by the signal of a supplementary trader is large (cp is an 
increasing and concave function of N). Then, by increasing P, traders increase the 
amount of information conveyed by the signal of a supplementary trader.
Looking at equation (19), we see that when p increases, the relative weight of the 
noise trading decreases.
However, when N becomes large, y converges to v, then, by decreasing P, insiders 
keeps the price from being too informative. We can also verify this last point by 




























































































increases ( prices become fully revealing), then, by decreasing (3, insiders decrease the 
information conveyed by prices.
b) Expected utility:
We now compute the expected utility of an informed trader, just after having 
observed y„, as a function of N and i/„.
From the assumptions of normality and exponential utility the expected utility is 
equivalent to:
(20) [E(f> | p,y„)-p]Kn -  ±K h~'
From the existence thoerem of the-previous subsection, if N>3 then Kn is still given 
by equation (11). So U„ can be rewritten:
(21) , ,  J E ( s  I p,y) -  p]2,  1 *  b ,
" 1 1 b f  (N-l)y 2x
[{N -l)y  xj
Substituing p and x in the previous equation yields
(22) U=-
A'Px,________
(Af-l)[2x +Afx -(Af-l)fcp] Ky,-y) N P
We can now compute the expected utility of a trader just after he has observed his 
signal. Using
£(y I y„)= !/„N(xo+x.)
£(y2 I y,)~___- __ (x +Nx )2
It follows that
(N-l)
N \ x v
(23) £ (u  I y„)=
Pt.







X X (x +X )f e v•
° |l
P2j
Proposition2: There exists N, smc/i tlmt for nil N>N, E(U„li/„) is decreasing. Furthermore 
himN̂ .  E(U„\yJ=0.
Proof: See appendix 1.
Interpretation: When N is small, the expected utility of profits is low because the risk 




























































































increases, the noise trading risk decreases and leads to an increase of the expected 
utility of profits. However, when N becomes large (>N,), the probability that an 
informed trader trades against another informed trader, instead of trading against a 
noise trader, is high and then the probability to make profits based on the private 
information decreases. It follows that the expected utility of profits decreases.
Then it would be interesting to find out what happens when the amount of noise 
trading increases proportionnaly to the number of informed traders. So, now we will 
assume the variance of z is Nap.
Equations (14), (15) and (16) remain unchanged as functions of ip, but we have now,
(25) _ ( N - 1 ) ^ _
(N-l)P2+Na^c,
Propositions: For all N>l+l/(2az\ ) ,  (5 is an increasing function of N and 
himN̂ _P < (azh ) m.
Proof: see appendix 2.
Interpretation: When the number of insiders increases, the price is affected in two 
ways. First, the risk of divergence from the fundamental value increases (noise 
trading effect). Second, ÿ  becomes a better estimator of v (information effect).
(i) If a f> (l/4 ij, then for all N>3, P is increasing. The noise trading effect always 
dominate the information effect. Increasing P, traders reduce the relative weight of 
the noise trading in the price and increase the relative weight of the information.
(ii) If a /< (l/4 tl), then when N is small P is decreasing. The information effect 
dominates the noise trading effect. As soon as N>7+7/2a/x,, the noise trading effect 
dominates the information effect and P increases.
Corollary: cp<1/3
Proof: cp is an increasing function of p. P < (afx,)1'2 then ip < (N-V/3N < 7/3. QED.
The expected utility of an informed trader after the observation of his private signal 
is now:






r ï / , 7
(N -1 )V 2 t„  ̂ No2 
Tt.T. X; +X. + “ j F
Proposition 4: There exists TV* such that for all N>N‘ E(U„I i/„) is decreasing. Furthermore 
LimN__ E(U„\yJ=0.




























































































As in the previous case, there exists an optimal number of informed trader 
independent the private signals.
However, a large range of simulation have been performed and results show that, 
except for a set of signals of small measure, E[U„\y„] is decreasing for all N>3.
To explain this result, let us write E[U„ly„] as follows: E[U„I y,,]=A(N)yn2 + B(N)
The following observations have been made:
- For all vectors of parameters (b/i^z^oj and for all N>3, B(N) is decreasing.
- There exists vectors (b,T,.,x„,oJ, such that for all N>3, A(N) is decreasing.
- For all vectors (b,xr,ztl,o.J such that A(N) admits a maximum A(N') with N’>3, 
E[li„ I y j  is always decreasing except for large values of y ,‘: y„2 larger than 5 standard 
errors. The probability for such signals is less than 10'5, so this set of signals can 
be neglected.
A possible explanation is that noise traders dominate the market and that the 
domination increases with N. Then, despite their informational advantage, insiders, 
when their number increases, cannot keep the price from diverging far from the 
fundamental value. As a consequence, informed traders' expected utility of profit is 
decreasing.
c) Comparison with other results:
Pagano (1989) considered a model similar to Kyle's: traders choose linear strategies 
and act as imperfect competitors. However, only speculators participate in the 
market. Traders, instead of being endowed with private information, are endowed 
with a random number of shares of the risky asset (z„) where, for all n=l,...,N, z„ is 
distributed with mean zero and variance a 2.
So, as in the modified version of Kyle's model, the noise in this model increases 
proportionally to the number of traders.
The expected utility of a trader just after z„ has been observed is:
(N-2 ) a 2 
N(N-1)
Pagano establishes the conditions under which equilibrium implies the concentration 
of all traders on the same market.
Suppose that each agent can choose between market A and market B. The choice 
between the two markets is open to each agent only ex ante: having selected one of 
them, he can trade only on that market.
Let Na and NB denote the number of agents expected to trade on market A and B 
and by SA and SB the corresponding sets of agents.




























































































(Na -Ì)Nà Na (N„-1)Nb nb
which is equivalent to
, N .-2
W ° , 2l W - l )  AUAf.-l)
IV.-2 , i i
1 - 2z 2(—----—)>0
" IV. IV.
Pagano defines a Two Market Conjectural Equilibrium (TMCE) as one in which the 
conjecture of agent about the number of agents trading on the two markets (NA,NB) 
are fulfilled in equilibrium.
Proposition (Pagano, p 262): In the absence of differential transaction costs, no TMCE 
exits, unless the two markets are identical (NA=N„).
Proof: see Pagano p 269.
Pagano comments this proposition as follows:
"Thus, if trade is costless, all traders tend to concentrate on a single market. In 
equilibrium two markets can only coexist in the knife-edge case where they are 
identical. This equilibrium however is not robust since a slight perturbation in 
conjectures is sufficient to revert the economy to the one-market equilibrium. For 
instance, if people conjectured that on market A they would find at least one more 
trader than in market B, they would all converge on market A and the other would 
disappear."
In the modified version of Kyle's model there may exist a TMCE with NA*NB if the 
two markets are informationnally isolated.
Proposition 5: In the absence of differential transaction costs, for any vector of parameters 
(b,Te,xv,aJ such that N'<3, there exists a tivo markets informationally isolated conjectural 
equilibrium with NA=NB+1.
Proof: As N*<3, for all n=l,..., N, E[U„I i/„] is decreasing. Then no trader in SB has an 
incentive to trade on market A. Traders in SA are indifferent between the two markets 
and they trade on market A.
Expectations are fulfilled. As a consequence, a TMCE exists. Q.E.D.
So, in this model, the two market equilibrium is robust in the sense that traders will 
never concentrate on a single market.
IV A PURELY SPECULATIVE MARKET
One can wonder which result, Pagano's proposition or proposition 5, will be verified 
if we consider a purely speculative market, i.e. a market in which only 




























































































In the original version of Kyle's model, it is assumed that traders' initial wealth is 
zero. We now assume that each trader n ( n=l,...,N) is endowed with a random 
amount of risky asset z„ (where z„ is distributed with mean zero and variance o f)  and 
is endowed with a fixed amount of risk free bond with return normalized to 1.
First, we need to redefine a symmetric linear equilibrium.
Definition: A symmetric linear equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the strategies Kn 
(n=l,...,N) are identical linear functions. Thus there exist constants, (3, 8, y, and 0 such that:
(26) K„=9+Pt/„+8z„-yp
a) Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium:
Proposition 6: Under the assumption that traders are endowed with a random amount of 
risky asset




(28) E(ÿ I P* y„> z„) = ('- -<p)t<>,„ Nyp - N6 + (1-8)Z„ ]
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Since 5 is endogeneous, we can see that traders can act strategically on the amount 
of noise in the model. Traders can influence the amount of information revealed by 
price via two variables: the sensitivity of demand to private information ((3) and the 
sensitivity of demand to endowment (5).
We also need to adapt lemma 1 to the new assumption.
Lemma 2: Assume that p=p„+XK„ and that p,„ v, y„ are jointly normally distributed for all 
n=l,...,N. Let a„ a2, aj, a4, and x’ be constant such that
E(? I P„, ?„ Z„) = Var \v  \ Q  = X*
Let K„‘ denote the maximizing quantity and p‘ be the maximizing price and assume tlwt the 
second order condition 2 \  +bVar(v | pn, yn, zn)>0 holds:




























































































n )  K . = = E<? 1 P ’Vn-Zj-P '+ teJ
" XO+aJ+blx’ X+b/x
Case 2: IfX(l+a,)+b/x'=0 then
12) p . = % v M M
2X +i/x *
Proof: We proceed as Kyle did to prove lemma 1.
Trader n's final wealth is
(33) W„ = (v-p)K„ + pz„ + B„
Let l„=(p„,y„,z„), then to maximize U„ is equivalent to maximize
(34)
[£(v | iy p ] K s p z n+B0-±KlVar{v Q  = £(v I
+B ~—K*/x' 
° 2
The first order condition for utility maximization yields 
(35) E(y | /„) -  />„ + Xzn - (2X*bK)Kn = 0
Assuming that the second order condition holds, we can write 




K ■ = + a2y„ + (a3^)z„ + a4
" 2A. + 6/t*
The rest of the proof is similar to Kyle's demonstration with the term (a3+X)z„ + a4 
substituing a3 in the numerator of K,'. QED
, , (AM)fcV
Proposition 7: Assume ze >0 and at >0.1/N>2 and xe<----- —-----  , there exists a unique
symmetric linear equilibrium. This equilibrium is such that
(38) N -20=0 P=(— -
AM
2x





































































































Proof: From the market equilibrium condition ^  Kn = ^P ^  zn , we can write
(40)
Let X =




and P- = ( ^ î h [ (" -1)0 + + ^ . nzj - E w * .  ]
(41) P = P„ +
Step 1: let us assume that case 1 of lemma 2 holds. It follows that
E(y \ P,yn*n) -  p + -  Z"
(42) AT = (1V-1)Y
1
(Af-l)Y
Putting (28) into (42) yields
6/ T
(43) r  = -
M pt 0 (l-<p)x (lV-l)y<pT (1 - ô) + Pt Pt -1Vy<pt,
‘  ---- -------- y» + -----.o--------------------Z„ -  — —--------P
- p ^ - +p b — I —
(AT-l)Y (AI-1)y
+fc
px+(M-l)Yf>P P t +pf>
(Af-l)Y





















('V-1)Y<Pt.(1 -6 )+P t




























































































(44.b) and (45) imply
(46)
(44.d) and (45) imply
(47) 2 .  PM(AT-1)8-1]
* (W-lKl-6)
So, from (46) and (47)
(48) 1 -  «  = p bht




Then (49) and (45) imply
and (49) and (50) imply
If P is positive then the only solution to (44.a) is 0=0. If P<0 then 0 is indeterminate. 
We now look for the conditions under which the two inequalities are satisfied. 
From (45), if p is strictly positive then y is stricly positive, so [(IV-l)yr1 + b/x > 0 .
(,/V-2)èV
From (50), if N<2 or if N>2 and t >-------------  , P<0 .e \r
From the expression of E(v | p,y,„z„) and p=p„+\K„, if y is strictly positive, the 
coefficient of p„ in E(v \ p ^ y ^ z j4 is strictly positive . Then, As bh > 0, it follows that
N
(52)




























































































Then if N>2 and x <
{N-2)b2a2z
N
the two constraints are satisfied.
Step 2: Assume that case 2 of lemma 2 holds.
It means that we have 2X+bVar(v | pn, yn, z„)>0 and \(l+a,)+b/x'=0
It follows that
(53) p  = ■. X, r  for anY yn and z„.2 A +»/x
The only solution is a2=0, a,=-A and a4=0.
a2=0 means that yn gives no information given p„ and zn. Given the expression of pn/ 
the only possibility is pn=v. This solution is impossible if xf>0  and a/>0.
Step 3: Assume that the second order condition of profit maximization does not hold. 
This implies that
(54) £(v | yn* „ p j-p n+ten = 0 
which is equivalent to
(55) (a1-l)p(i+a2yn+(a3+A)z(l+a4 = 0 for any yn and z„.
The only solution is a,=1, a2=0, a,=-A and a4=0. This solution is impossible.
So, there exists a symmetric linear equilibrium. Q.E.D
Corollary 2: <p is independent of N and (p<l/2.
Proof: Equation (49) states that (p is independent of N and that cp is an increasing 




The proposition states that in a purely speculative market, for any given number of 
traders and variance of endowment, there exists a critical level for the precision of the 
information beyond which an equilibrium does not exist any more. We can 
understand this by looking at equation (49). If <p is too large then price become too 
informative.
b) Traders' welfare:

































































































P ,- bP = —(y— z)
v
*  = P(y„-y) + (i--^ )(z„ -i) ♦ z
(56) Un = [£(v | ynj>j.f)-p\Kn + pzn - = [£(v | >„p,z„) -p -^ -K n]Kn + pz„
Substituing parameters p,5 and y for their value yields
1 Nt.U. =
(57) 2(N-l)x
■Cy.-y)  ̂ (z„-z) + “ Zj jp(y„-y) + (l--^ )(z„-z) + z,2(1V-I)x 2x
P,-- O ’— z)z.
We now compute £((/„ | y„.z„)
2 2 2 r
, y« fiV-2,2 2 
E(Un I V , )  = ---------------- '------b V  - T-' -
22>XC (x  ̂+ X̂ )2 N
b t
XC(1V-1)X, + IV J
(58) V . 2b2a2
2xc  ̂ IV
•(x +— —(x +lVx )) + x +——  (t +1Vx ))]
v N - 1 e hl AT~1 e '
1 .N-2,2 2 lr
- [ - 7 T b  °z -  X j [(IV-l)x N
N v N - l '
1 (2l' +X*)T‘ ♦ *V ]
2bc (xv+x,)2xv
with x = xv + xe + (IV- ĉpx  ̂ and c = xe + £>2oz
Proposition 8: When traders are heterogeneously informed and heterogeneously endozved 
with sImres of stock, no TMCE exists unless the tzvo markets are identical.
Proof: Assume that a TMCE exists. It implies that for any trader n, the choice 
between market A and market B is independent of the realizations yn and zn since on 
both markets endowments and informations are realizations of normally distributed 
variables with variances o f  and o f  given.




























































































traders have an expected utility that is an increasing function of N.
For those traders, the optimal strategy is to concentrate in one single market.
Let






1 t.tv  tx -2 .2  2- ---- ---------- 1-----o o,
2f>xc ( x .+ x /1 *
X 1*J
1 \2b2°2z, , ,, ,2C+1 2 , M
XC(jT-l)Xe X
— —  [— b2o‘ 




(63) Gn(x) = A(x)y2„ + *MyA  * C(x)z„2 + D(x)
where the function A(.), B(.), C(.) and D(.) are defined on [3,~[. Then
(64) E[Un I = Gn(N)
and
(65) G > ) = A'{x)yl + B\x)ynzn * C'(x)z2 * D \x)
where (') denotes the derivative. It is immediate that B'(x) is strictly negative. Then 
G'n(x)>0 is equivalent to
(65) 2
B'(x) V , B'(x) n
D \x)
B \x)
Computing the functions A'/B’,C'/B', D'/B' one can show that they are all 
continuously differentiable on [3,°°[ and that they have a finite limit. Then they are 
all bounded. Furthermore it is immediate that C'(x) is strictly positive.
Then, for any x, and for any interval I„cR' such that yne In, there exists z’(I„) such that
for all zn s [z'(In),°°[, dB[Un \ V „ ]
dN
> 0 ; and for any interval IncR+ such that yne I„,
dE[U I y ]
there exists z.(In) such that for all zn e ]-<*>,z.(I„)], ------------ > o .
dN
Then there exists some sets Sy and Sz of strictly positive measure such that for any 





























































































This paper highlights some of the differences between purely speculative markets in 
which noise is added to price by endowment shocks and markets with both informed 
speculators and noise traders:
- On the existence of an equilibrium: In a purely speculative market, for any given 
number of speculators in the market, there exists a critical level for the precision of 
the information beyond which a symmetric linear equilibrium does not exist any 
more. This results from the fact that speculators can act strategically on the amount 
of noise added to price.
In a market with both insiders and noise traders, a symmetric linear equilibrium 
always exists when there are more than two insiders.
- On traders'welfare: Propositions 2 and 4 establish that in a market with noise 
traders, for any signal, there exists an optimal number of traders in the market.
In a purely speculative market, we can see from the proof of proposition 8 that, for 
some endowments zn and a signal yn, traders have an increasing expected utility and 
some traders with the same endowment but a different signal have a decreasing 
expected utility.
As a consequence and as proposition 5 and proposition 8 show, in the absence of 
differential transaction costs, if ex-ante informed can choose between one large on 
two smaller informationally isolated markets, traders may choose to trade on small 
markets only if noise traders also participate in the market. In a purely speculative 
economy, informed speculators will only trade in large markets.
APPENDIX 1 
Proof of proposition 1:
Let /(P,x) (x-l)P2 (x-2)
(x-l)P2+ a2t. 2(x-l)
We consider the implicit function f(fS,x)=0.
3/ = 2 (x - l)p a \.   ̂ b 
3P [(x-l)p2+a 2t ]2 2t '
2z
(ip __ 3//3x 
dx




dx [(x-l)P2+ a 2Tj2 2 (x -l)2
We can see that for all x, 3f/3p>0. So dp/dx<0 when 3f/3x>0. 
3f/3x>0 is equivalent to
Pz[2czV P 2](x- 1)2 -  2 (x -l)p 2o2t e -  > 0




























































































Let h0 be the solution of - i L l -  then
( x - m 2+o2s .  2(x-l) x(.x-l)
h„ is such that p2<h,,2<a,2x(, then 2cz2x,,-p2>0.
So, there exists x° such that for all x>x°, dp/dx<0.
Let N° = int(x°)+l and we have the desired result.
we now compute LimN_>_ P(N)
0<p2< ^  2 2 ' then, Lim P(N)=0 
K N -l N N“ “
QED.
Proof of proposition 2: The proof is divided in three steps.
Step 1: For ail N>N°, (Nxe-(N-l)Pb) is an increasing function of N 
and LimN_>_(Nre-(N-l)Pb)=~
Let f(x)=xxe-(x-l)bP(x).
-^ = x-b p -(x -l)b ^ . 
dx dx
From the proof proposition 1, for all x>x", -(x-l)b(dp/dx)>0.
From equation (16.c), (N-2)xc - (N-l)bP>0 then, xc-bp>0.
So, for all x>x°, d[xxc-(x-l)Pb]/dx>0.
It follows that for all N>N°, (Nxe-(N-l)Pb) is an increasing function of N.
UmK so LimN_J,Nxt -(N-l)pb)=<*
Step 2: Let g(N)
N(N-1) l(f/~ l)2
+ (N -l)
T vT «  ( T v + T . )
There exists N, such that, for all N>N, g(N) is decreasing.
Let g,(x)=(x-l)P/x, g2(x)=P/x and g3(x)=[x(x-l)P]‘' where xe [3,°°[-
(i) there exists x2 such that, for all x>x2, g,(x) is decreasing.
^ 1 ^ - — [P+x(x-l)— ] so, if p+x(x-l)— <0 then (dg,/dx)<0 




























































































For all x>x°, (dp/dx)<0 then, For all x>x°, p+x(x-l)(dp/dx) < P+(x-l)2(dfS/dx)
As for all x>x°, P(x) is decreasing and converges to 0 when x goes to infinity, there 
exists x3>x° such that, for all x>x3, p2xe+pb-2az2xe2<0.
Then, there exists x4>x3 such that, for all x>x4 p+(x-l)2(dp/dx)<0 
Let x2=x4, we have the desired result.
(ii) The proof of proposition 1 implies that for all x>xD g2(x) is decreasing.
If there exists x5 such that, for all x>x5, [p+x(dp/dx)]>0 then for all x>x5, g3(x) will be 
decreasing.
The denominator of dp/dx is a polynomial of degree 4 and the numerator of 
x(dp/dx) is a polynomial of degree 3 that is always positive. Then the numerator of 
[p+x(dp/dx)] is a polynomial of degree 4 and the coefficient of x4 is p5. As P>0, there 
exists x5 such that, for all x>x5, [p+x(dp/dx)]>0.
Let N,=intfMax(x2,x5))+l, we have the desired result.
We now compute LimN__ E(Unl yn).
Limx_„ [xxe-(x-l)bp]=°o, Limx_*„ g,(x)=0, Limx__ g2(x)=0, and on [x5,°°[, g,(x) is upper 
bounded. Then LimK_,_ E(Unl y„)=0. QED.
APPENDIX 2:
Proof of proposition 3:
p +(x - l) 2̂ = .
dx
|2dp = (^ - l)2P2[P2t f+Pb-2ofxJ] + 2p2a 2xe(3+2ftp)(x-l) + cdx^bp-x^ 
x 4Pc^x,(x-l) + b[(x-l)P2+c^xJ2
(i) P2<az2xe/2
Let XD be the solution of (N- 1)X2 _ N-2 where Xe [3,<=<>[,
N(X2+a2zxe)-X 2 2(W-1)
P2<X02 then p2<az\ . / 2 .




























































































Let /(P,X)= (X-1)P2 X-2 bp
(X-l)P2+Xa r̂. 2(X-1) 2x.
We consider the implicit function f(P,X)=0, then dp_ 3^8X 
dx a/jap
3/_ 2pofx(X-l)  ̂ b ^ n 
3p'[X(P2̂ X f)-p2]2'2xr >
9/ _ - X 2(P4+oY) + Xp2(P2-2(rx.) ♦ P2(2crx.+1) 
a x ' 2(X-l)2[X(P2+crx,)-p2]2
Let H(X) be the numerator of 9f/9X. H(X) admits a maximum for X=-
2(p4
-2° ^ t-<0
and is always decreasing for all X larger than this value.
We can rewrite H(X) as follows: tf(X) = -p4X(X-l) - X2o*x2 + p2[l-2(X -l)ozxJ
So, if 2(X-l)az2x„>l then H(X)<0. 2(X-l)az2xe>l is equivalent to X > l+ l/2az2xe.
So, for all X > l+ l/2oz2xe, dp/“dX>0. It follows that for all N > l+ l/2 a i!2xe, P is decreasing 
with N.
We now establish that P < (az2x j ,/2.
Let h° be the solution of ---- ^  ^ then A2=----- - * *
(x-l )h*+xo\xt 2(^-1) (x-1)
P2<h„2 then, LimN̂ J> < ( o / x / 22. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4: The proof is divided in four steps.
Stepl: Nxe-(N-l)bP is increasing when P is increasing.
From equation (24), Nx -(N-l)b&  = 2x [1+(N-1)__ ^  ^ ___]
^(P ^aT j-p2
Let us consider the function /,(*)=- U-1)P2
x(p2+oz\ ) - p 2




























































































When d(3/dx>0, — =-------------------- ----->0
dx [x(p2+cV)-p2]2
(x-1)
2 \+ xr-{x -\)b$
Step2: Let f 2(x)= 
decreasing.
dU X) .  n _  f2* -. 1 _ .  (*-D
, there exists x*, such that, for all x>x*„ h(x) is
dx
< 0 »  I —+(x-l)-jL | I — ■+1,1 -  — y -/’P‘ -   ---- -P(X--fcP) < 01 v dxJ 1 X J v2 r
On JX'̂ oof, dp/dx>0, then — + (x-1)—  > 0 and ^p(x) > —---- P(x *) .
x dx x x ’O
x*-\
Let A(x)=------ [xg-fcP(x)] . From the implicit function f((3,x)=0, it follows that
— 2— > 0 then xe-pb > 0.
2(1V-1) 2x,
-  rp , . . j p l f 2^  1 (x-l) .  R; ( X - l ) „ ,  fp , , , , P 1
*  lx Jr_1 dxJ l— ' ^  ’ V Wvtp) < lx (~ +X'M W
for all x>X0’.
From the fact that p is bounded and the expression of (dp/dx), it is immediate that
LmxJ[2-+(x-1)^]=0 
x dx
Since A(x)>0, there exists x", such that, for all x>x‘„ dh/dx<0.
Step3:
- When P is increasing, -— >s decreasing.
- Proceeding as in the proof of proposition 2 (step 2, (ii)), one can show that there 
exists x'2 such that, for all x>x‘2, p/x is decreasing.





























































































Step 4: LimN__ E(Unl y„)=0.
Pt. f, ^  2 . N -l V 2x, Nofl _ * P LLimw — — —l(N -l)2----- -— y 2 +
N (N -l)^ ' ( x o+x / "  X.X, xc+x
where PL=LimN_>„P(N).





Proof of proposition 6:
The market equilibrium condition is equivalent to
1 y .  1-a y '
N-1 ei (A/-1) p ̂ 4" Z>
1
(iv-i)p
[Nyp -  NQ -  Py( K l SizJ
Let h,- -----------[Ayp -  .V8 -  py + (l-S )z ]
' (JV-l)p
then Karfv ! y fyh )  = Kar(v | y,,z,,p)
a v  -u  i x r i -i ( î -ô)2 2iand x = K<*r ‘(v | y , * /»  = xv+x,+[— xe
which is equivalent to x = xv+x4+(lV-l)-
Pz+(8 - l)2o2x4
So <p = P2
P2+(8-1)2o2x,
Using lemma 4.1 from Kyle (1989), it follows that 
(1 — <p)x cpx
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